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Between Two Stools? 
The Government’s ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Agenda 
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The 7/7 London bombings and the failed 21/7 attacks of July 2005 had, and continue 
to have, a significant impact on British politics and society. They represented the 
emergence of a new phenomenon for Britain, home-grown suicide bombers willing to 
attack civilians. In both the bombers’ willingness to die, and in the deliberate 
targeting of civilians, these attacks were arguably different to previous ‘terrorist’ 
threats to Britain, such as by various Irish republican groups between the 1970s and 
1990s. The fact that the bombings and attempted attacks of July 2005 were not a 
one-off spasm has been shown by a number of more recent trials and convictions for 
terrorist conspiracies 1. These cases  have all involved young British Muslims (some 
of them converts) and plans for causing explosions, and been based in a number of 
different towns and cities. The alienation of a small minority of young British Muslims 
from ‘British’ values and lifestyles that these attacks and conspiracy cases have 
apparently exposed has added fuel to the already heated public debates around 
national identity, ‘shared values’ and integration that were prompted by the 2001 
violent disturbances in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford (all involving Muslim-origin 
young men), and the closely-related emergence of the new ‘race relations’ policy 
priority of community cohesion 2. Community cohesion’s critique of ‘parallel lives’ and 
a profound lack of shared values in ethnically-mixed communities has led to a strong 
policy focus on direct contact and integration 3. Implicit within the development of 
community cohesion policies has been a critique of past race relations policy 
approaches, with ‘multiculturalism’ characterised as leaving Britain ‘sleepwalking to 
segregation’ 4. Increasingly, ‘multiculturalism’ has also been blamed by a number of 
right- of -centre think tanks, such as Policy Exchange and the Royal United Services 
Institute, for undermining Britain’s ability to combat terrorism, both at home and 
abroad 5.Whilst Government Ministers have avoided direct attacks on 
multiculturalism, their pointed, post-2001 emphasis on the new concept of 
community cohesion speaks volumes. The Opposition have not felt similarly 
constrained, with Conservative Shadow Home Secretary Dominic Grieve MP 
commenting that ‘we’ve actually done something terrible to ourselves in Britain’ 
through multiculturalism and that, ‘in this vacuum, both the BNP and Hizb-ut-Tahir 
rise’ (The Guardian, 27th September, 2008).  
 
Post-2001 community cohesion recommendations for citizenship tests and 
ceremonies for new migrants, a stronger sense of  an overarching ‘British’ identity 
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and a much greater focus on citizenship education for young people have all been 
re-energised in the wake of the 7/7 attacks. Alongside this has come a new policy 
initiative aimed directly at support for, and promotion of, Islamist terrorist ideologies 
within British society, as part of government’s overall counter-terrorism strategy 
(CONTEST). The ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (PVE) initiative was first announced 
by government in October 2006, and operationalised via Government Offices and 
local authorities from 2007, with continuing further expansion and development. My 
aim in this paper is not only to discuss the aims and content of this emerging PVE 
agenda, particularly in relation to its target group of Muslim young people, but to also 
highlight real concerns over its likely effectiveness and impact. In doing so, my 
intention is not to trivialise the threat posed by Islamist terrorist groups, and it is 
important to praise the government’s emphasis on community and education-based 
work as well as security-based measures. However, I am questioning whether the 
PVE policy agenda, as it currently stands, will be effective, or whether it will actually 
negatively impact on the vital goals of community cohesion and positive community 
relations. My fear is that PVE is neither making a helpful contribution to community 
cohesion, or effectively engaging with the political and doctrinal understandings that 
are attracting a small minority of young Muslims towards extremism. 
 
Preventing Violent Extremism 
In announcing the creation of the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund’ in 
February 2007, then-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 
Ruth Kelly said, ‘Violent extremism seeks to drive us apart. Together, we will 
overcome it’. The PVE Pathfinder Fund made available an initial £6 million for 
2007/08  from the Safer and Stronger Communities Fund, via Government Offices to 
70 local authorities whose populations included 5% or more Muslims, for action 
programmes aimed at Muslim communities in general, and, within those 
communities, at those most at risk of recruitment or ‘grooming’ by extremists, or at 
those ‘justifying or glorifying violent extremist ideologies and terrorism’ (‘Preventing 
Violent Extremism, Winning Hearts and Minds’, DCLG, 2007:7).This population 
calculation was based on six year old data from the 2001 Census; it has 
subsequently been amended for the 3 year, £45 million programme for 2008-2011 to 
include all local authorities with a minimum of 4,000 Muslims within their population, 
but this lower threshold still excludes Crawley in West Sussex, home of 3 of the 5 
Muslim young men convicted over the ‘Operation Crevice’ plot to bomb the 
Bluewater shopping centre in Kent, and the Ministry of Sound nightclub in London. 
 
 Consistent with more general New Labour policy design, the ‘Pathfinder’ document 
stressed the need for locally-designed approaches whilst at the same time offering 
explicit objectives that all local authority funding bids should address, and have 
agreed by the regional Government Offices. Acutely aware of the danger that 
Government language, particularly if aping American-style ‘war on terror’ 
formulations, could further alienate and radicalise sections of Muslim communities, 
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the PVE documentation uses ‘we’ consistently. Indeed, the Government has also 
established a Research, Information and Communications Unit within the Home 
Office, with one of its key functions being to help the various arms of national and 
local government avoid  ‘aggressive rhetoric’  and to use language that encourages 
the positive involvement of Muslim communities 6. The further PVE funding for 2008-
2011 includes an expansion to cover Youth Offending Teams and Young Offenders 
Institutions via the Youth Justice Board, Police Forces, and Further and Higher 
Education Institutions, which are viewed as key recruiting grounds for Islamist 
extremists, and confirmed as such by the testimony of ex- activist Ed Husain, who 
was previously involved in Islamist group Hizb-Ut-Tahir (HUT) 7. Information –sharing 
and ‘tension monitoring’ are a key part of this PVE expansion, particularly the 
developing work with Colleges and Universities, with the hope that extremist activity 
can be identified and effectively countered. Underpinning this is a significant 
strengthening of relationships between Police Forces and educational institutions 
across the full age range of children and young people, with the Association of Chief 
Police Officers aware that there is a ‘pressing need to develop the growing 
relationships between the police and education sector at every level with regard to 
preventing violent extremism’ (‘New strategy to stem flow of terror recruits’, The 
Guardian, 28th February, 2008).The pressure from central government , via Local 
Area Agreements under the Common Spending Assessment, on Local Authorities, 
and their local partners, to be involved in hard-edged monitoring, information-sharing 
and ‘forums against extremism’ is significant, as this extract from the Local 
Government Association briefing document ‘Strategic Issues –Preventing Violent 
Extremism’ shows: 
 
The selection or non-selection of National Indicator 35: Building resilience to violent 
extremism emerged as a contentious issue during LAA negotiations.  
The Home Office, via the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT), have 
produced a ‘heat map’ which identifies 30 areas with a high risk of producing violent 
extremists and are seeking a good take-up of NI: 35 across this group...The HO 
believe that local authorities that do not select NI: 35 are not prioritising PVE and 
concluding that little or no PVE work is being undertaken. To persuade local 
authorities to select NI: 35, the HO is applying pressure via the Police, and senior 
officials during LAA negotiations which has had only limited success. 
(LGA, April 2008:2) 
 
The PVE policy agenda involves a number of key approaches. Alongside ‘tension 
monitoring’, these include the promotion of shared values and the challenging of 
extremist ideologies, the building of civic capacity and leadership within Muslim 
communities, and the strengthening of the role of faith institutions within those 
communities. This has led to a significant focus on educational standards in general, 
and citizenship education specifically, in after-school Mosque schools and 
Madrassahs, and capacity building training, support and movement towards 
charitable status for many Mosques and other Muslim community organisations. 
Above all, though, PVE activity to date has focussed on engagement with Muslim 
young people, using a variety of approaches and techniques, through youth work, 
schools, and arts and sports activities. These youth-focussed activities have included 
4 
 
the promotion of local ‘anti-extremism’ forums and ‘Road shows’ on extremism and 
Islamophobia. The DCLG document, ‘Pathfinder Fund –Mapping of Project Activities 
2007/08’ (DCLG, 2008), the product of a ‘light-touch’ review requested by the Prime 
Minister’s Office, claims that as many as 44,000 people, most of them young people, 
have been engaged by the PVE programme, but it also acknowledges that the 
monitoring and evaluation data from the programme to date is weak and unreliable.  
 
PVE: Contradictions and Problems 
Two major contradictions are immediately apparent within the PVE agenda outlined 
above. The first is the exclusive focus on ‘Muslim communities’, a specific 
ethnic/religious concern explicitly at odds with the Government’s approach to 
community cohesion. Secondly, and relatedly, is a consequent avoidance of ‘violent 
extremism’ in other ethnic communities, especially the significant growth of activity 
by, and popular support for, the British National Party within some white 
communities. Both contradictions are discussed below. 
 
The post-2001 prioritisation of community cohesion as the government’s approach to 
‘race relations’ has marked a clear break with previous policies of ‘political 
multiculturalism’ or anti-racism. Those policies, developed in the wake of the 
watershed 1981 riots and the consequent analysis of structural racial discrimination, 
saw an emphasis on support and funding for facilities and structures within specific 
ethnic communities. The hope here was that strong organisations and channels of 
communication within specific ethnic communities would both counter discrimination 
and provide safety valves for future tensions. Such approaches indeed made a 
contribution to significant advances in racial equality but also had a clear downside 
that was exposed by the 2001 disturbances: the policy focus on ethnic-specific 
needs and concerns had cemented physical and cultural ethnic segregation and 
fatally weakened cross-ethnic dialogue and contact. The community cohesion 
response has been to promote direct contact and communication across ethnic 
boundaries through youth activities, school ‘twinning’ and partnership working 
amongst diverse community agencies. Alongside this has come a clear Government 
presumption that funding for ethnic-specific agencies and facilities can now only be 
justified if tangible community cohesion benefits are identified. The continued 
acceptance of this analysis can be seen within the PVE agenda, with its priority 
focus on Muslim youth and women, rather than traditional ‘community leaders’. 
There also appears to be an acknowledgement that past policies involved public 
support for ethnic-specific organisations with questionable political positions, with the 
PVE commitment to fundamentally rebalance our engagement towards those 
organisations that uphold shared values and reject and condemn violent extremism 
(‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds’, DCLG, 
2007:9).However, this new approach is arguably seeing government develop a new 
cohort of favoured ‘community leaders’, judging by the recent block on junior 
International Development Minister Shahid Malik attending the IslamExpo event  
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(‘Promotion of clients and stooges will get us nowhere’ The Guardian, 17th July 
2008). 
 
In the light of this move to community cohesion, the Muslim-specific focus of the PVE 
agenda and funded-activity can only be seen as a self-defeating contradiction. The 
evidence from local authority programmes to date is overwhelmingly of work 
exclusively with groups of Muslim youth, as discussed above. Given the 
demographic profile of the terrorist plots outlined above, the need for such a Muslim-
focussed approach may seem obvious, but the community cohesion analysis 
suggests that ethnic segregation is actually the context for this growth in violent 
Islamist ideologies, a growth arguably taking place well before post-2001 
developments in British foreign policy. Here, the profound physical, cultural and 
political ethnic segregation caused by racial discrimination, and cemented by policy 
concerns with specific ethnic ‘needs’, has created inward-looking mentalities within 
communities and a strengthening of essentialised ethnic and religious identities that 
has enabled minorities within those communities to move towards extremism. The 
DCLG describes Islamist extremism as a threat to cohesion, but arguably this 
extremism is an outcome of the lack of cohesion. Such an analysis is equally 
relevant to white working class communities, who are increasingly supporting the 
British National Party and other far-right groups, with the structural economic 
exclusion those white communities share with many Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
communities further fuelling this growth in ethnic-specific and defensive ‘identities’.  
 
Additionally, analysis of the 2001 disturbances clearly identified that competition over 
ethnicity-based government regeneration funding, and white resentment over the 
(incorrect) perception that Asian communities unfairly benefitted from that funding, 
was a key part of the racial tension preceding the disturbances. This drove 
Government’s post-2001 determination to avoid ethnic-specific funding and 
regeneration schemes, yet PVE appears to be exactly that, a Muslim-specific funding 
stream that has real potential to further fuel white working class feelings of 
‘unfairness’, whilst leaving some Muslim young people feeling that they have been 
‘targeted’ using broad and negative generalisations about their communities. 
 
The logical conclusion of the analysis above is that the response to extremist 
Islamist ideologies is not more work with groups of Muslim young people but instead 
programmes of integrated cohesion activity that move further and faster in altering 
the perceptions of young people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds by bringing 
them together for shared programmes of activity focussed on fun, and on shared 
concerns. Such programmes, if planned and implemented creatively, have much 
more potential to grow a meaningful and shared national ‘identity’ then any speeches 
by politicians. Good examples of such work already underway includes the Youth 
Parliament ‘Safe Space’ initiative, involving young people of all ethnic and religious 
backgrounds in political debate and processes relevant to young people, as well as 
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by the minority of Local Authorities who have insisted on genuinely integrated 
cohesion activities within their PVE-funded activity. The DCLG explicitly says that 
PVE is not the same as a wider concern for community cohesion, but Local 
Authorities in key areas like West Yorkshire have been clear that they struggle to see 
the distinction between the two policy areas. 
 
The above analysis makes the lack of focus on other types of politically-motivated 
violent extremism within the PVE agenda even harder to justify. Prior to the 7/7 
attacks, the most serious terrorist attacks on London in recent times had come in 
April 1999 from the ‘nail bomber’ David Copeland, a White Supremacist. Copeland 
carried out 3 bombings in 13 days, killing 3 people and injuring 139 people, many 
seriously. His targets were a mainly gay pub in Soho, and the multiracial areas of 
Brick Lane and Brixton. Copeland had quit the BNP because it was not ‘hardline’ 
enough for him, instead joining the National Socialist Movement (the political wing of 
Combat 18) in the hope that they would launch a paramilitary struggle. More recent 
court cases have exposed other attempts by far-right activists to create and use 
explosive devices 8, whilst the ‘Red Watch’ website is infamous for its 
encouragement of harassment against anti-racist campaigners. Such realities 
expose the myth that far-right parties are now respectable and only concerned with 
electoral progress, but this success at the ballot box may explain the reluctance of 
government to provide free publicity for such groups by publicly linking them with 
‘violent extremism’, as criticism in 2006 of then –Employment Minister Margaret 
Hodge MP for acknowledging the rise of the BNP in east London indicates. Right-
wing extremism is invoked in the Introductions to a number of the Government’s PVE 
documents (including an incorrect reference to ‘Mosley’s brown shirts’!) but this 
appears to be nothing more than a superficial nod towards even-handedness. Such 
apparent inconsistency, emphasised by Tony Blair’s post 7/7 call to ban Islamist 
groups like HUT whilst the BNP continues to grow, is not lost on Muslim young 
people. Awareness of the highly sensitive nature of the ‘PVE’ title, and of its explicit 
focus on Muslim ‘communities’ (itself a highly problematic term) has led Government 
to shorten the working title of the policy programme to ‘Prevent’, with the title 
‘Pathfinder programme’ sometimes being used at a local level. These highly opaque 
titles suggest that politicians are aware of the contradictions and problems discussed 
above and are concerned to not further antagonise opinion within Muslim 
communities, but also suggest that Muslim young people and communities involved 
in PVE-funded activity at a local level may not always be clear of the focus and aims 
of this work. 
 
Concerns over capacity to deliver 
A second area of concern over this PVE agenda is its ability to achieve success on 
its own terms. That is, can the programme actually positively influence Muslim young 
people away from support for, or even involvement in, violent Islamist activity, 
through the types of activities outlined above? I suggest that there are considerable 
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grounds for pessimism here, as the programme is currently designed, with some of 
the evidence in support of this assertion coming from previous attempts to 
educationally influence racist white young people attracted to racial violence and far-
right political involvements, as well as from the first year of the PVE programme. 
 
An additional facet of the ‘political multiculturalism’ or anti-racism race relations 
policy approaches increasingly dominant  post -1981 was anti-racist educational 
approaches operationalised in schools, colleges and youth work settings. Whilst 
well-intentioned, and sometimes successful with young people of particular social 
backgrounds, these anti-racist educational approaches involved inherent problems 
and unintended consequences that should act as salutary warnings for those 
designing PVE programmes. An immediate problem is the way young people from 
disadvantaged backgrounds understand and interpret any educational agenda 
designed and enforced by those in power and concerned with changing behaviour. 
Anti-racist rules and programmes introduced by schools from the 1980s onwards 
came up against this problem, with white working class pupils often rejecting these 
new anti-racist norms as part of their wider rejection of compulsory schooling that felt 
irrelevant to their lives and experiences. The extension of the PVE programme to 
Youth Offending Teams, Schools and the Police risks a similar rejection by Muslim-
origin young people selected for involvement, particularly if implementation is as 
‘clumsy’ as anti-racism implementation sometimes was. The most graphic example 
of this was the racist murder in Manchester of a young Bangladeshi man by a fellow 
pupil in 1986, with the independent Inquiry identifying the clumsy implementation of 
anti-racist policies as having strongly contributed to the context of the murder 9. 
 
Central to the rejection by many white working class young people of ‘anti-racism’, 
as it was often implemented educationally on the ground, was the perception that 
these anti-racist norms were explicitly critical of the assumptions, attitudes and 
cultures of white working class communities by ‘outsiders’ (including middle-class 
white people). Here, white working class communities were often implicitly portrayed 
as racist and ignorant, with cultures weaker and inferior to the ethnic minority 
religions and cultures ‘celebrated’ by multiculturalist and anti-racist policies. This led 
to  feelings of ‘unfairness’ amongst white working class young people, fuelled by the 
perception that their attitudes and behaviour were judged more harshly than similar 
behaviour by other ethnic communities. Such a clear focus within PVE on Muslim 
communities, and the associated lack of focus on racist extremism within white 
communities could well have the unintended consequence of hardening a defensive 
and antagonistic ‘Muslim’ identity amongst those involved in response to a 
perception that their whole identity and community lifestyle is being implicitly 
criticised and scrutinised. Arguably, post 9/11 popular media coverage has already 
had this affect, as witnessed by more overt displays of Islamic dress by many young 
Muslims, and PVE activity could further exacerbate this trend. Associated with the 
‘white backlash’10 by some white working class young people against anti-racism 
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was the perception that they were viewed as ‘all racist’, even though many 
vehemently denied that their motivations during inter-racial conflicts were actually 
racial. A concern with the PVE agenda would be that at least some of the 
practitioners involved in its delivery carried similar assumptions about Muslim young 
men, fuelled by some media coverage and popular prejudices concerning religiously 
observant young men with beards. Within this are problematic issues of targeting. 
Youth Offending Teams have been allocated PVE funds, yet few if any young 
offenders are likely to be referred to YOTs for involvement in violent extremist 
activity, as numbers associated with such plots are small. This suggests that PVE 
activity through YOTs is likely to be extended to all those seen as ‘racially motivated 
offenders’ even though ‘RMO’ programmes are only slowly developing within the 
Youth Justice system, and identification of which offenders are genuinely ‘racially 
motivated’, and should so be on a RMO programme, is far from straightforward. This 
leads to the question of whether ‘racial motivation’ can really ‘read across’ to support 
for ‘violent extremism’. An even more questionable alternative would be to ‘profile’ 
Muslim young offenders more generally for PVE activity. 
 
This leads to a focus on those responsible for implementing the PVE educational 
agenda, such as youth workers, Youth Offending Team workers and teachers. There 
is clear evidence from research amongst youth workers in West Yorkshire that such 
professionals lacked confidence and felt under-prepared when attempting to 
implement previous anti-racist policies. Such feelings were based on the perception 
that they were implementing policies and rules around highly sensitive issues that 
they didn’t really understand, and certainly didn’t feel confident to debate and explore 
with young people and communities who often had strong and forthright opinions on 
those issues.11 These perceptions by professionals tended to lead either to total 
avoidance of the issues, or of a rigid, ‘party line’ implementation in tension with their 
professional training as educators, and which often fuelled the negative reaction from 
young people discussed above. Given that any educational process hoping to make 
genuine progress on the PVE agenda would inevitably lead to detailed discussion of 
Islamic teachings and doctrine, ‘Muslim’ identity and highly-emotive foreign policy 
issues around Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, it is likely that the large-scale and 
broad brush expansion of the PVE programme now underway would lead to one or 
both of these responses. Initial evidence suggests that ‘avoidance’ is the 
professional response, with the PVE educational work focussing on Muslim young 
people, but explicitly not engaging with why some Muslim young people are actually 
attracted to violent Islamist ideologies, or with the broader political issues that fuel 
Islamist anger. Much of the activity to date in the name of PVE is good youth work 
and should be supported, but it largely avoids explicit focus on the key concerns 
driving the PVE agenda –  the ‘sharp end’ of politics and ‘extremist’ ideologies is not 
being discussed in most cases, as DCLG Minister Hazel Blears acknowledged in 
December 2008. It is clear that a significant number of Muslim young people, 
especially those aged 15 years and older, do want to debate and explore Muslim 
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identity, extremism, and Islam’s treatment in the media, and in wider geo-politics. 
This interest drove the growth in Muslim Students Societies on campuses, and in 
Islamist groups like H-U-T from the early 1990s onwards, so clarifying that enhanced 
‘Muslim’ identity amongst young people predates foreign policy controversies such 
as Iraq. In saying this, I certainly do not intend to condemn education professionals 
doing sterling work with disadvantaged young people but simply to highlight the large 
gap between the stated aims and focus of the PVE agenda and the reality of much of 
its implementation. 
 
Ironically, given the community cohesion concern over single ethnic group funding, it 
is largely progressive, community -based Muslim organisations that are explicitly 
discussing political issues and the associated attraction of Islamist ideologies with 
young people, and who are most likely to be aware of young people at risk of 
‘radicalisation’. One such example is the Hamara Centre in Beeston, South Leeds. 
The ring leader of the 7/7 bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan, was a part-time 
youth worker within one of Hamara’s projects, and may well have developed the plot 
with two other local men whilst working there.Hamara are now in the forefront of 
developing a meaningful PVE agenda, with Muslim youth activities that enable 
discussion of extremism within a wider context of democratic political involvement, 
community cohesion direct contact with other ethnic/religious groups and analysis of 
Muslim identity within wider British society. Such activity suggests that Muslim young 
people are able and willing to clearly discuss ‘violent extremism’ and its underlying 
political discourse, if professionals are confident and ready to undertake such work 
within an explicit context of community cohesion and citizenship activity. To date, 
however, the bulk of PVE funding has been channelled through local authorities, with 
little reaching Muslim-led community/third sector organisations. This limited 
involvement of the community sector may well be a result of the rapid policy 
development and operationalisation, rather than a community cohesion-inspired 
reluctance to fund single ethnicity organisations, but it is severely limiting the ability 
of Muslim communities to lead, and be seen to lead by the wider community, on the 
crucial issue of tackling support for, and ideologies of, violent Islamist extremism. 
 
Between Two Stools ? 
Clearly, Britain faces a serious and persistent problem of home-grown, Islamist 
terrorism supported by a small but extremely alienated minority of young Muslims. It 
is not within the scope of this article to discuss the role of recent  foreign policy in 
fanning this extremist activity, but any serious analysis of the development of the 
groups or ideologies arguably providing a ‘pathway’ towards such terrorism suggests 
that this worrying development predates 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. In this 
context, it has not been the intention of this article to downplay the threat or to 
question the need for specific policy measures that challenge support for, and 
pathways towards, such extremism. Indeed, I fully agree with the PVE agenda’s goal 
of engaging with young people in a ‘hearts and minds’ initiative that strengthens 
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support for, and engagement with, democratic values, processes and activity. The 
problem is that, as it is currently constituted, the PVE programme  may not only fail 
to achieve tangible progress in this regard, but may also have the unintended and 
negative consequences of alienating targeted Muslim young people, creating 
resentment amongst marginalised non-Muslim young people, and contradicting 
ongoing attempts to develop meaningful programmes of cross-community contact in 
the name of community cohesion. The current review for the DCLG of how to 
develop a ‘whole community’ approach to PVE by Lord Kamlesh Patel of Bradford 
may well highlight this. 
 
These worrying possibilities have all been apparent in the initial stages of local PVE-
funded activity 12. It is clear that the bulk of the funded activity directed at young 
people, with a minority of honourable exceptions, is very much focussed on Muslim 
young people. This highlights inconsistencies in government discussions as to 
whether the problem really is just a ‘small fringe’, or something more widespread that 
necessitates demonstrable changes in attitudes amongst Muslims (PVE Pathfinder 
Fund Guidance note for Local Authorities, DGLC, 2007:7).The broad brush focus on 
‘Muslims’ within PVE risks alienating parts of the significant number of Muslim young 
people worked with nationally under the less than straightforward title of ‘Prevent’, 
whilst creating resentment amongst white working class young people once again 
marginalised by a funding priority. The very recent DCLG policy concern with such 
white young people suggests that Government is acutely aware of this. At the same 
time, the Muslim-only focus of much PVE activity is flatly in contradiction with 
community cohesion, arguably ignoring the post-2001 evidence on the origins of 
much prejudiced and extremist thoughts and activity in such starkly segregated 
localities. 
 
Whilst working in contradiction to community cohesion, and repeating the mistakes 
of the past that required cohesion to become a priority, the PVE agenda in its early 
stages has also failed to actually engage in a robust and upfront manner with the 
Muslim young people who want and need to discuss their understanding of faith and 
identity, and the real political conflicts, interpretations and events driving those 
understandings of faith and identity locally and globally. In this way, it risks falling 
between two stools and mirrors previous, and often unsuccessful, efforts to develop 
‘anti-racist’ educational activity with marginalised white young people that frequently 
foundered on the lack of confidence and skills by the professionals being asked to 
implement these programmes in very challenging social situations. The successful 
examples of such anti-racist projects were situations where youth workers were 
skilled and confident enough to explore young peoples’ attitudes and prejudices 
openly and robustly, emphasising the positives of their lives and communities as well 
as challenging those prejudices through searching dialogue. Such work with young 
Muslims would, and does, involve very open discussion and criticism of British 
foreign and domestic social policy in relation to Muslims, as well as an airing of 
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internal community dynamics and issues that many people have a vested interest in 
not discussing. This approach to work with young people, alongside meaningful 
community cohesion and dialogue with other communities, offers the possibility of 
the PVE agenda avoiding falling between two stools and thus having a genuinely 
positive impact. 
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